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“We don’t just want the jobs,” Tyree Scott, the leader of the United Construc-
tion Workers Association (UCWA), announced in June 1972 to a group of one 
hundred black construction workers and their allies in Seattle, Washington. “We 
want some control over them.”1
Scott’s announcement, borne of two years of frustration with the way that 
on-the-job resistance had undermined affirmative action, marked a dramatic 
shift in the Seattle campaign for community control of the construction indus-
try. It had been three years since Scott had led direct action protests in Seattle 
that inspired the U.S. Department of Justice to file suit against the four elite Se-
attle building trades unions. In 1970, federal Judge William Lindberg found the 
racially exclusive union hiring halls and apprenticeship programs in violation 
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Because previous attempts to negotiate 
voluntary affirmative action had failed, Lindberg ordered the unions to desegre-
gate through an ambitious affirmative action plan to train a total of roughly one 
hundred black “special apprentices” per year.2 But during 1970–1972, the Seattle 
construction industry failed to meet the court-ordered affirmative action goals, 
and their noncompliance went largely unpunished. The unions and employers 
blamed the terrible economy, complaining that the region’s affirmative action 
goals and timetables had not changed to reflect the recession in the construction 
industry. The UCWA, formed in 1970 to represent black workers who entered 
the Seattle construction industry under the court order, had a different explana-
tion. It questioned the very structure of affirmative action plans that relied on 
white journeymen and employers to train people whose presence on the job they 
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deeply resented. The original sin of affirmative action, the UCWA argued, was 
that it put racists in control of the desegregation process. Or, as Tyree Scott put it, 
“you can’t leave those who created the problem in charge of the solution.”3
The UCWA responded to the failure by the unions and employers to comply 
with the court order by demanding that black workers be made the subjects and 
not merely the objects of antidiscrimination law. It issued its demands through 
a series of direct action protests that brought to a halt construction on $50 mil-
lion in private and government construction projects in the Seattle area during 
the first week of June 1972. The UCWA partly sought to redeem the integrity 
of the law by demanding the immediate hiring of black apprentices and the ac-
tive enforcement of the original affirmative action goals of the court. But, more 
important, the UCWA demanded to join the lawsuit and be granted traditional 
union and employer powers to screen, hire, and dispatch black apprentices. Scott 
explained the UCWA position to Judge Lindberg, stating that the UCWA would 
not allow work to continue until the court granted black workers “control and 
self-determination.”4 The judge, Scott later explained to supporters, “thinks we 
want to integrate and become white. We’ve changed our minds and want in-
tegration with recognition that we are different. We want to control our own 
destiny.”5
The UCWA shift from demanding jobs to seeking power represented a radical 
response to the failure of the Philadelphia Plan approach to affirmative action. 
President Nixon’s defunding of War on Poverty employment programs and his 
slashing of federal construction spending had eliminated many of the jobs that 
black radicals thought would be made available to them. As a result, both gov-
ernment imposed and voluntary affirmative action plans pitted white and black 
workers against one another for increasingly scarce jobs. The economic cost of 
compliance with the federal plans increased dramatically as unemployment in 
the construction industry skyrocketed. Meanwhile, the economic cost of non-
compliance decreased as building trades unions successfully convinced Presi-
dent Nixon to promote “voluntary” affirmative action plans, hollowing out the 
enforcement of fair employment law by the Department of Labor (see Griffey, 
chap. 6 in this volume).
The lack of political will by the federal government to enforce the goals and 
timetables of affirmative action plans forced the largely ad hoc Black Power 
campaigns of the late 1960s to reinvent themselves. Because many movements 
to desegregate the building trades in the 1960s were led by people who lacked 
experience in the construction industry and spoke for black workers without 
including them, they were often ill-equipped to monitor the implementation 
of affirmative action plans. Some were compromised by the role they were 
given administering weak plans; others struggled to adapt to the early failures 
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of affirmative action. In many cities, to the degree that affirmative action in the 
construction industry persisted at all, it was largely through pre-apprenticeship 
programs (sponsored primarily by the Urban League and funded by the Depart-
ment of Labor) that left the unions in control of apprenticeship and dispatch 
programs. Pre-apprenticeship programs increased the visibility of the Urban 
League in promoting affirmative action, but they did so at the cost of empha-
sizing social service over community organizing and emphasizing individual 
black self-help over collective action. They were institutions that operated on the 
premise that unions and employers would implement affirmative action plans in 
good faith, when often they did not.6
In a few cities, black construction worker organizations evolved in the early 
1970s to challenge the inability of pre-apprenticeship programs to enforce af-
firmative action requirements, and to challenge the ongoing control that unions 
retained over their apprenticeship programs and hiring halls. The three most 
sophisticated black construction worker organizations to emerge in the 1970s 
as watchdogs of government affirmative action plans were the UCWA in Seattle, 
Harlem Fight Back in New York, and the United Community Construction Work-
ers (UCCW) in Boston. As community organizations, they represented predom-
inantly black inner-city residents who demanded jobs and urban reconstruction 
during an era of federal abandonment, white flight, and deindustrialization. As 
worker organizations, they promoted a community-centered labor politics that 
connected minority caucuses within the unions to broader social-movement or-
ganizing. By using fair employment law and affirmative action plans to organize 
for political and economic power, they produced and occupied a hybrid politi-
cal space between labor unions and social service agencies. Their contribution 
to black urban politics in the 1970s helped translate Black Power at work into 
community-controlled hiring halls and apprenticeship programs for inner-city 
residents. These campaigns were part of a broader movement that transformed 
the black community control campaigns of the 1960s into community-based 
minority worker organizations and “poor workers’ unions” during the 1970s.7
This chapter presents the history of the UCWA as a case study for under-
standing the origins, organizational structure, and legacy of black construction 
worker radicalism in the 1970s. (Similar histories still need to be written about 
Harlem Fight Back and UCCW.) It describes a form of labor radicalism forged 
through the “hellfire of hostility” that black workers faced in the workplace when 
they entered the construction industry via affirmative action.8
The history of the UCWA provides an opportunity to extend the civil rights 
movement history well into the 1970s instead of portraying the era as one of 
mere cooptation and declension. The UCWA organizing model gave organiza-
tional voice and political power to minority workers entering hostile workplaces 
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through affirmative action plans. It used class action Title VII lawsuits to orga-
nize an affected class of minority workers into community-based labor organiza-
tions that could oversee the implementation of court-ordered affirmative action 
plans. The UCWA then used this model to organize Filipino cannery workers in 
Alaska; black construction workers in Denver and Portland; black truck drivers 
in Oakland; and the Southwest Workers Federation, an eight-city black worker 
organization in southern cities largely untouched by the economic gains pro-
duced by the black freedom movement.
The UCWA’s insistence that minority workers oversee the implementation 
of affirmative action presented a direct challenge to the trend that has received 
more attention from civil rights movement historians: the emergence of middle-
class professions, inside and outside government, to manage the enforcement of 
civil rights laws passed in the 1960s and early 1970s. Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act outlawed both racial and gender discrimination in hiring by employ-
ers and unions, but it did not explicitly describe the process for desegregation 
for those found guilty of violating the law. As National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP) Labor Director Herbert Hill pointed 
out during the 1960s, “Title VII is not self-enforcing.” It offered a legal sanction 
for workers to challenge discrimination on the job, but provided little guidance 
for whether and how the government would support worker claims. For middle-
class bureaucrats who fought over how to enforce the law, the 1970s may have 
been an era “when the marching stopped” and black politics shifted from the 
streets to the state, “from protest to politics,” or “From Direct Action to Affirma-
tive Action.” But many workplace pioneers had a different experience, and the 
history of the UCWA shows that new black worker organizations emerged and 
direct action protests persisted as part of workplace battles for both power and 
inclusion in the 1970s.9
Workplace Culture as a Site of 
Resistance to Affirmative Action
The refusal by the Seattle building trades unions to negotiate even token affir-
mative action plans provided the crucial context in which the UCWA created its 
innovative community-organizing model. As documented throughout this vol-
ume, the exclusionary practices of the building trades unions blended with the 
politics of whiteness to deny union membership to nonwhite workers through 
informal means. Unions then refused to dispatch or apprentice nonwhite work-
ers, ostensibly because they were not union members.
In Seattle, as early as 1949, after local building trades had largely jettisoned 
their most explicitly racist membership policies, the Seattle Urban League 
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records detail “numerous reports of Negroes and other minority people who 
had not been admitted into building unions that were members of the Building 
Trade Council.” Letters to the council, however, were ignored, and meetings with 
council leaders produced no changes in apprenticeship hiring practices.10
The unions acknowledged that they had been openly racist before the 1950s, 
but were hard-pressed to explain why segregation persisted for decades after-
ward. By 1969, only 29 of the 14,821 members of the Seattle building trades were 
nonwhite. The most pervasive discrimination occurred in Ironworkers, Local 86. 
In 1969, the Washington State Board Against Discrimination found that “except 
for a rodman who worked for a day or two in 1939 no person who was clearly a 
Negro has ever been a member of or been referred by the Union to employment.” 
With “300 to 400 Negroes working as welders in Seattle manufacturing plants, 
shipyards, and even in construction work as sheetmetal workers,” the Local 86 
discrimination appeared blatant even to outsiders.11
To insiders, the racism within Local 86 was an open secret. Donald Kelly, a 
white apprentice in Local 86, recalled that his apprenticeship coordinator report-
edly told him, “we have no Negro apprentices, and we will never have no Negro 
apprentices. . . . When they file their application—we have a stack of applications. 
We will just keep pulling from the bottom just constantly.” Kelly later goaded the 
Local 86 business agent into telling him, “No black son-of-a-bitch bastard will 
ever work out of this union as long as I am business agent.” When Kelly challenged 
him by saying that blacks’ entry into the trade was “inevitable,” the business agent 
elaborated: “if they force me into it, I will take one of the black sons-of-bitches, 
and if I put him out on a beam at two or three hundred feet in the air, either he 
will walk it or he will fall off.” Kelly was later kicked out of the apprenticeship 
program and told that he “was not fit to be an Iron Worker” because he was a 
“hippie.” After first coming forward in 1967 with stories of union racism he had 
witnessed, Kelly “got the hell beat out of me” by people he had never seen before. 
During the melee, his assailants accused him of being “a nigger lover” and “the 
one who is trying to bring the black bastards in the iron workers.”12
The discrimination practiced by Local 86 was hardly unique. Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) interviews of black workers and white union leaders 
in Seattle conducted in late 1969 and early 1970 document how International 
Brother hood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 46, Operating Engineers Local 
302, Sheet Metal Workers Local 99, and Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 32 all 
used control of their hiring halls and apprenticeship programs in racially ex-
clusive ways. White workers with personal connections to union contractors or 
union leaders found it easy to receive dispatch or entry into apprenticeship pro-
grams even if they had no previous experience. But experienced black workers 
(from the Seattle shipyards and from the aerospace industry, from the military, 
and from War on Poverty job-training programs) faced an altogether different 
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process. If they were told about an out-of-work list at all, they were often put on 
a separate list so that the union could appear to be in compliance with the law. 
Many sat all day in hiring halls wondering why their names were not being called 
until finally they gave up and went back to industrial jobs. When Junior Lee, who 
had learned to drive heavy trucks in a federal Job Corps program, applied for dis-
patch from Operating Engineers Local 302, he was told that the only job available 
was over a hundred miles away in Yakima. When Lee said he was willing to find 
his own transportation out to the job, the dispatcher, according to Lee, “didn’t 
refer me to a job. He asked me, ‘Have you ever operated a yo-yo?’ I says, ‘No.’ He 
says, ‘Have you ever seen one?’ I says, ‘Yes.’ That was that.”13
When black workers applied for work directly to employers, going around the 
union hiring halls, employers were still bound to hire only workers referred by 
a union hiring hall dispatcher. This, in turn, gave unions far more control over 
hiring than they usually acknowledged. When Robert Lucas, the white owner 
of Lewis Refrigeration, called Local 32 in 1963 and specifically asked for a black 
plumber to be dispatched to his job, the dispatcher reportedly laughed and said 
“I can just picture my wife going to the back door and seeing a big black man 
there and he says ‘I came to fix your refrigerator.’ ” After about a year of trying to 
hire a black worker, Lucas finally gave up.14
From 1965 to 1968, leaders from various local War on Poverty agencies, the 
Urban League, the NAACP, and the Congress of Racial Equality all sought, but 
failed, to negotiate voluntary outreach and recruitment plans to desegregate the 
Seattle-area building trades unions. When the State Board Against Discrimina-
tion ruled in March 1969 that Local 86 had refused to accept a welder who had 
passed as white into its membership after he told his coworkers that he was black, 
the mainstream civil rights movement in Seattle publicly broke with the labor 
movement over building trades union discrimination and began seeking ways to 
hire non-union black workers on War on Poverty construction projects. Faced 
with the absolute refusal by unions to admit black workers or apprentices to their 
ranks, a coalition of civil rights organizations complained in March, 1969 to the 
American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
that Austin St. Laurent, head of the Seattle–King County Building and Construc-
tion Trades Council, was a “bigoted racist. . . . Every proposition, every plan, every 
program designed to assist minority youth into apprenticeship in the trades has 
been rebuked, opposed and stymied by him.” Meanwhile, St. Laurent refused to 
acknowledge racial bias within the labor movement and remained convinced 
that affirmative action was a scam for contractors to use civil rights groups to 
“break the back of the building trades unions.”15
This was the context in which Tyree Scott, a black electrician and head of a 
black contractors association seeking to gain access to Model Cities construction 
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projects in Seattle, finally got fed up with trying to figure out how to hire black 
workers without running afoul of the unions. Inspired by similar protests in 
Chicago, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh, Scott led a series of direct-action protests 
against building trades union racism during late August and early September 1969. 
The protests—which made decades of private grievances public—culminated 
when Black Power activists drove trucks into open pits at the University of Wash-
ington and briefly shut down air traffic at Sea-Tac Airport by marching on to the 
tarmac. These actions, which local media observers considered “riots,” inspired 
fear and immediate conciliation by local government officials and contractors.16
The unions were much less swayed by the Black Power protests, however. If 
union leaders showed up to negotiations during the job closures, it was usually to 
protest the negotiations as violations of their collective bargaining agreements. 
When employers and government officials created a unilateral affirmative ac-
tion plan to stop the protests and black workers began to appear on government 
construction projects in early September 1969, union members went on strike. 
When the courts forced union members back to work, they took to the streets. 
Austin St. Laurent organized the ad hoc Voice of Irate Construction Employees 
(VOICE) in early October 1969. Through it, he staged two marches of thousands 
of workers against King County Executive John Spellman and Washington Gov-
ernor Dan Evans (both of them Republicans) for participating in negotiations 
with freedom movement activists. The VOICE marches were similar to the rau-
cous construction worker counterdemonstrations seen in August and September 
1969 in cities such as Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Chicago. In Seattle, they were 
led by men wearing hard hats and carrying U.S. flags and signs filled with righ-
teous anger about “reverse discrimination,” including a prominent one that read 
“Equal Rights for Whites.”17
The hostility of the Seattle-area unions to the Philadelphia Plan was so abso-
lute that it brought a higher level of federal intervention in Seattle politics than 
in most other cities. When the U.S. Department of Labor briefly investigated the 
issue in Seattle at the request of Governor Evans, it “concluded that a voluntary 
agreement was unlikely to be obtained” because of the refusal of the unions to 
compromise, so it “referred the matter to the Department of Justice.” On Oc-
tober 31, 1969, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it would file a 
lawsuit—U.S. v. Local 86—against the elite five of the Seattle Building Trades 
unions for systematically denying black workers entry into union and appren-
ticeship programs.18
Even then, union resistance ensured that the case went to trial and was not 
settled. After six months of fruitless negotiations to bring the trades not named 
in the lawsuit into compliance with new federal affirmative action guidelines, 
both Seattle-area unions and contractors announced that they would implement 
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their own affirmative action plans. The unions promised training but did not 
promise to dispatch workers to jobs, and the contractors promised to hire new 
black workers only if the government would pay for it. Both sides claimed to be 
in compliance with the law, but the Department of Labor refused to fund either 
plan because voluntary affirmative action required a consensus of all parties.
Although successfully marginalizing the civil rights activists and holding the 
Department of Labor and contractors at bay, the failure of the unions to negoti-
ate a voluntary affirmative action plan with contractors and civil rights activists 
had the opposite effect of what unions intended. Judge Lindberg might have de-
ferred to a tripartite hometown plan as sufficient redress for past discrimination 
if he had found the unions guilty. But without such a plan, unions appeared to be 
operating in bad faith, and this invited more substantial forms of intervention. 
Believing affirmative action to be unconstitutional, they refused to settle the law-
suit, despite most observers believing that the Philadelphia Plan had changed 
the political landscape.19
The force that courts brought to bear on the Seattle building trades unions thus 
ended up being far beyond anything that would have come from the Department 
of Labor. Judge Lindberg, a Democrat from the New Deal era who had served as 
the secretary of the Washington State Senate in 1933 and had been appointed to 
the federal judiciary by President Harry Truman in 1951, heard U.S. v Ironwork-
ers, Local 86 a year before he retired. He issued his affirmative action decrees on 
June 16, 1970. The relief that Lindberg prescribed in the case was, according to 
William Gould, a fair employment attorney, “at the time of its issuance . . . more 
comprehensive and detailed than that set forth by any other judge in any employ-
ment discrimination case in the United States.” Lindberg called for the immediate 
hiring of forty-one black workers whose individual experiences the prosecution 
had used to prove a pattern of racial discrimination in the four trades. In addi-
tion, he ordered the creation of a special apprentice program with fewer restric-
tions to fasttrack black workers into journeymen status in two years instead of the 
regular four; loosened the age and education requirements for incoming appren-
tices; and set 1 : 4 minimum ratios of black apprentices to white journeymen at 
job sites and in training programs. Finally, to rearrange labor relations within an 
industry that employed tens of thousands of people, Lindberg created the Court 
Order Advisory Committee (COAC), a quasi-governmental institution, directly 
accountable to him, to bring all parties together to enforce his order.20
Putting Unions in Charge of Their Desegregation
Because their long-standing resistance to affirmative action had played a signifi-
cant role in the Seattle building trades unions’ being placed under court order, it 
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would have been surprising if they had not resisted Lindberg’s affirmative action 
plan. But Lindberg’s order, modeled on other 1960s-era government manpower 
programs, did not take the possibility of such resistance into account. Instead, it 
focused its attention on breaking down the barriers to work without consider-
ing the relationship between exclusive hiring practices and social hierarchies on 
the job.
The intellectual foundation for these manpower programs—which came 
from industrial relations literature pioneered by business economists and 
lawyers—relied on social psychology that treated the racially exclusive work-
place as normative and the excluded worker as deficient in human capital and 
in need of remedial support to be successfully integrated into skilled trades.21 
Affirmative action programs based on these well-meaning studies left union 
journeymen in charge of the construction workplace, thereby granting them 
substantial power over desegregation. Affirmative action, in this context, meant 
forcing unions to dispatch black workers to jobs and union journeymen to 
train black workers in their trade without explaining exactly what union mem-
bers’ good-faith participation in affirmative action would entail.
The difference between good faith and resistance was especially difficult to 
establish in the largely informal workplace environment of the construction in-
dustry. According to a study of the construction industry in the early 1970s by 
Jacob Riemer, a sociologist and construction worker, construction work is inher-
ently difficult to monitor because it uses a variety of specialized trades whose 
skilled craftsmen are spread across a construction site. This made “a tight orga-
nizational structure difficult to achieve and in many respects impractical.” In-
stead, high-skilled craftsmen worked with relative autonomy on job sites and 
coordinated their activities through a distinct masculine subculture that was as 
social as it was professional and whose mores were often at odds with bureau-
cratic and bourgeois norms. The physical and dangerous nature of the work was 
frequently linked to demonstrations of physical prowess that were saturated with 
sexual references. These physical displays of achievement and acts of bravado 
easily crossed over into fights and physical pranks that asserted forms of ritual 
dominance over others on the crew.22
The initiation of others into the trades was an important way to assert one’s 
individual male prowess and the fraternal identity of the group. Socialization 
into the construction workers’ subculture often came through physical and 
character hazing that both allowed journeymen to demonstrate their skills and 
tested apprentices’ fitness to work in dangerous situations. Learning a trade was 
synonymous with being integrated into the social life of the construction site, 
and formal evaluations of apprentices emphasized “explicit mastery of skills and 
techniques particular to the work” with “an acceptable adoption of a related set 
of implicit qualities.” These “qualities” were based on individual fitness for work 
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and the ability to work on a team, defined vaguely as “character,” which became 
synonymous with manhood—and, given the restrictions on entry into the trade, 
whiteness.
The hazing of new recruits, in this context, was an integral part of the con-
struction workplace. As Riemer notes, “the work culture of the building trades 
dictates that new apprentices should be teased, ridiculed, and generally pushed 
to their limits. As part of their initiation into the fraternity of tradesmen and 
as a test of their acceptability, apprentices must continually prove themselves 
‘under fire.’ ” Examples of such initiations for white men could include sending 
apprentices for tools that did not exist, scaring them by performing risky feats 
meant to discourage them, sending them to undesirable workplaces, or giving 
them demeaning jobs.23
In Seattle and across the country, resentful journeymen responded to the im-
position of the mandates that they train black workers by making their usual 
ritual hazing of apprentices punitive instead of redemptive. The pushing of black 
apprentices to their limits, rather than initiating them into the trade, thereby 
served to reassert white men’s exclusive claims to work, to union membership, 
and to workplace authority.
Union resistance to affirmative action was at its most overt during the first 
couple of years of the program. During September 1969, in response to ad hoc 
affirmative action plans meant to quell street protests, union members simply 
walked off the job. When the courts forced them back to work, journeymen ig-
nored their apprentices. Calvin Amerson, one of the first black apprentices to 
enter the Seattle construction industry, told a local reporter, “The first six days, 
we didn’t do any work. Just sit around. Then today, they had me working out for 
a little while, for about a half an hour. It’s just out there, you know, people have 
a funny attitude, you know. They look like they hate you or something when you 
walk into their jobs. They don’t want you out there.”24
In fall 1969, union journeymen developed a series of other tactics for refusing 
to train unskilled black workers. The Seattle chapter of the American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC) found that black workers experienced “a range [of 
tactics,] from a hands-off treatment, where they are virtually ignored and given 
no training, or at best given routine, dead-end jobs, to harassment, name-calling, 
intimidation, and ‘accidents.’ ”25
These strategies threatened to turn civil rights law into a dead letter. If black 
apprentices contested the treatment that they received at the hands of white 
journeymen, they could be accused of insubordination or even be fired if goaded 
into a fistfight. If they did not contest their hazing, the chances that they would 
learn a trade were low. Some of those who stayed tried to get paid for doing no 
work—which white workers cynically used as evidence of the folly of affirmative 
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action. In the end, all sixty-five of the first black apprentices who entered the 
Seattle construction industry in fall 1969 ended up quitting within a few months. 
They were not replaced because the plans required only that a certain number be 
hired, not retained on jobs or as union members eligible for dispatch.26
As a result, even before the court order was issued in Seattle, union jour-
neymen found a way to meet the statistical goals of affirmative action plans on 
paper while hollowing out their substance. Unions could cycle through black 
apprentices instead of training them and discourage black workers from staying 
or learning a trade. When workers quit, unions disavowed any responsibility and 
blamed the black workers for the high attrition rates, often implying that non-
white workers were too lazy or unintelligent for skilled work and that affirmative 
action was impossibly utopian social engineering.27
Union resistance strategies expanded as the economy worsened during the 
early 1970s and Lindberg’s court order imposed a much stricter regime of goals 
and timetables for minority hiring. A simultaneous decline in commercial and 
military airplane contracts during the late 1960s and early 1970s drove Boeing 
to lay off much of its workforce, devastating the Seattle-area in the process. The 
company reduced its workforce from 100,000 in July 1968 to 48,000 people in 
the Seattle area by the end of 1970, and would cut one third of those remaining 
jobs by summer 1971. A growing housing recession both locally and nation-
ally, magnified by the Nixon administration’s choice to cut federal construction 
spending, also produced substantial layoffs in the region’s construction and log-
ging industries. The state’s resulting unemployment rate of 12 percent was double 
the national average, and Seattle’s unemployment rate of nearly 16 percent was 
the highest of any major metropolitan region in the United States. While Nixon 
aide John D. Ehrlichman took a special interest in the city’s plight, his hands were 
tied by the free market ideology of Nixon’s economic advisers. It wasn’t until a 
decade later that the region even began to recover from its decline and deindus-
trialization with the growth of the region’s computer and biotech industries.28
The economic crisis deepened social conflict over racial discrimination in the 
Seattle construction industry. Union leaders did not seem to direct white worker 
resistance to affirmative action. But their steadfast opposition certainly encour-
aged workers to believe that affirmative action was illegal and antiunion, and was 
a means by which to take away “their” jobs. The specialized nature of the trades 
and idiosyncratic quality of the construction industry subculture in turn made it 
easy for individual workers who were resentful about their precarious class and 
racial status to take advantage of new black trainees in ways that had systematic 
effects. Michael Fox, who represented the UCWA beginning in 1971, described 
the work conditions that grew out of the Seattle court order as “a hellfire of 
hostility towards the presence of these black apprentices, who were referred to 
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on many occasions as Lindberg Journeymen.” Henry Andes, an IBEW business 
agent, concurred, albeit vaguely. Describing the tenor of the work environment 
following Lindberg’s order, he noted, “There was [pause] a lot of turmoil, a lot 
of resistance and a lot of hate and dissension.”29
Todd Hawkins, an Ironworker apprentice and UCWA activist, recalled that 
as the court order began to be implemented, “industry racism really began to 
flourish in insurmountable numbers, incidents on jobs, journeymen or white 
workers didn’t want to relate to the old black journeyman or the apprentices, did 
[not] want to teach him, did not want him in his shop.” A journeyman might, for 
instance, tell a trainee to polish pipe, but he “doesn’t really tell you why the pipe 
needs to be polished, why the oxidation needs to be taken off, how the oxidation 
will affect the solder once the heat has been put to it. He doesn’t take time to ex-
plain. He just pigeonholed him” by giving him what appeared to be useful work 
without teaching him.30
White journeymen might also put their apprentices in situations in which 
they were likely to be injured. Hawkins explained:
If you look at someone arc-welding, you can burn your eyes very seri-
ously. And this journeyman thought it was a big joke to have this appren-
tice watch him weld. And you know, it injured his eyes very seriously. 
The next day it feels like sand. And if you watch it for any period of time, 
it just gets worse. This kid was messed up for more than a week, and they 
wanted to cancel him out of the program [for missing work].31
Or white workers might send an apprentice to get the prized tools of a master 
craftsman, only to be immediately accused of theft because he had not been told 
that these particular tools were off-limits. Others were sent for tools that do not 
exist to intentionally provoke the apprentices’ anger in a way that could earn 
them bad reviews or start fights that would get them kicked out of the program. 
Acts such as these added a toxic dimension to the pranks and hazing that had 
been a regular feature of construction workplace culture before the entry of the 
nonwhite trainees. They also allowed racism to be masked as redemptive and the 
pioneers’ angry responses as an indication of their inability to “take a joke” or get 
along with the team.32
The subversion of the dispatch system by union dispatchers and contrac-
tors further undermined the affirmative action plans from within. According to 
Northwest AFSC Director Arthur Dye, during the first couple of years of the 
court order,
Some [black] workers appeared at the hiring hall day after day for sev-
eral months and were never dispatched. If they began to ask questions 
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why they were not dispatched they would be sent out to jobs in Port 
Angeles or Yakima, both a hundred miles or so away, only to find out 
that when they arrived at their destination there wasn’t a job. Or they 
would be dispatched to a job where there was considerable possibility 
for physical intimidation.33
Even when there were jobs in such far-flung places, it placed an extra expense 
on black apprentices’ participation in affirmative action plans. A number of ap-
prentices did not have cars or had cars that were not in proper condition to make 
long commutes, and carpooling with white workers was out of the question. 
Moreover, some employers moved black apprentices from job to job to have them 
counted by government compliance agencies more than once—a practice that 
both increased apprentices’ transportation costs and reduced their ability to learn 
a trade.34
The government was largely impotent to counteract the subversion of affir-
mative action by unions and employers. Three of the four unions subject to the 
court order filed an appeal (the Ironworkers chose not to) that removed the case 
from Judge Lindberg’s jurisdiction and prevented him from substantively chang-
ing his order. And although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Lind-
berg’s ruling on May 17, 1971, the subsequent union appeal of that ruling to the 
Supreme Court was not denied until December of that year. According to Luvern 
Rieke, a University of Washington law professor who chaired COAC, “during the 
time that the appeal was pending, nobody was giving anything. . . . So there was a 
year and a half or two years during the appeal period in which the district court 
couldn’t make changes and obviously changes are necessary.”35
By exploiting their control of workplace culture and maintaining social hi-
erarchies at work, on-the-job resistance turned affirmative action into more or 
less a dead letter while union appeals were pending in the courts. According to 
a Seattle Urban League report, “Union representation on the committee rarely 
[attended] the meetings and, excluding Electrical Workers Local 46, Union ef-
forts to implement the Special Apprentice Program were token. The Unions ar-
gued that the economy was too poor to provide work for the total number of 
Special Apprentices required by the order.”36
Contractors, especially small ones, made similar economic arguments. In De-
cember 1971, some contractors openly refused to hire black trainees even when 
their contracts required it. When the matter was referred to COAC, it found itself 
powerless to tell contractors or unions to hire staff they claimed they could not 
pay. According to a report by the Seattle chapter of the Associated General Con-
tractors (AGC), “It is extremely difficult for any of the [COAC] staff to get other 
than a courteous reply when there is no authority back of their request other 
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than the burdensome, difficult process of requesting a court order.” Seeking legal 
redress through the courts was made more difficult because the Department of 
Justice lawyers tasked with enforcing the court order were located in Washing-
ton, D.C., and black workers lacked formal representation in the lawsuit.37
The United Construction Workers Association 
and Black Construction Worker Radicalism
The UCWA emerged from the black community control movement as a vehicle 
for black workers to challenge the on-the-job subversion of affirmative action. 
But the idea to form a new organization to represent black construction workers 
in Seattle came from an unlikely place—the Northwest Chapter of the AFSC.
The AFSC began consulting with Tyree Scott and other black contractors after 
white workers drove black apprentices off the job during fall 1969. Scott had 
come to the attention of the AFSC while leading the Central Contractors Asso-
ciation (CCA)—an organization of black contractors brought together in spring 
1969 by the Seattle Model Cities program to get federal construction contracts 
and train black construction workers. Scott grew up in a small segregated town 
in Texas in the 1940s and 1950s; he dropped out of high school to enter the Ma-
rine Corps to support his family when his girlfriend became pregnant. He served 
in the Marines for nine years, where he learned to be an electrician, but decided 
against reenlisting after serving in the Vietnam War and seeing white soldiers’ 
racist treatment of the Vietnamese. After his discharge, Scott moved to Seattle 
with his family to work for his father’s electrical business, which meant working 
on nonunion jobs at the margins of the industry because of local building trades 
union racism. Scott soon became friends with a number of other black workers 
in Seattle with experiences similar to his own: skilled veterans, primarily from 
the South, who had migrated to Seattle for work after being stationed in one 
of the military bases in the area, only to find Seattle housing and employment 
completely segregated. It was through this social network of black contractors 
that Scott became a founding member and leader of the CCA. And as the CCA 
began staging direct action protests during August and September 1969, Scott 
consciously expanded his organizing beyond black contractors to include black 
welders and other industrial workers from the Seattle shipyards.38
In early 1970, the AFSC chose to bankroll the UCWA—hiring a commu-
nity organizer to be its director, providing it with office space and a secre-
tary, and working with it to seek fund-raising from church and progressive 
philanthropies—while deferring to its leadership and membership on its ul-
timate course of action. The AFSC report announcing the formation of the 
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UCWA to potential donors and supporters claimed that the group intended to 
recruit “minority building tradesmen and potential trainees” to “exert pressure 
to enforce the laws already in existence.” No matter how that worked in prac-
tice, according to the report, “the important thing, we feel, is to facilitate some 
community organization among the people most affected by discrimination in 
employment in the construction industry.”39
After three months investigating the issue and interviewing dozens of people, 
the Seattle AFSC hired Scott to lead the new organization. The AFSC consciously 
chose not to dictate the direction that the UCWA would take once formed, al-
though its various ideas highlighted the experimental and hybrid quality of the 
organization. The AFSC at once imagined that the UCWA might evolve into 
an industrial union of black workers excluded from the craft unions, a caucus 
of black workers in the unions, a service organization for apprentices, a watch-
dog group for affirmative action enforcement, an ally for black contractors, or 
a combination of all these things. Once hired in June, Scott chose to reject both 
the dual-union and caucus options that the AFSC had considered. Instead, he 
linked the organization to the U.S. v. Local 86 lawsuit by making the UCWA a ve-
hicle for black workers to demand vigorous enforcement of the court order. This 
meant enlisting black workers to study the law, determine their rights, and decide 
how best to assert them. Reflecting on this use of affirmative action litigation as 
basis for community organizing, in 1975 Scott recalled that “the UCWA is built 
around the Title VII case and other cases brought since then. I spent a lot of time 
learning the use of Title VII, what [it] actually meant.”40
Scott held the first meeting of the UCWA on July 14, 1970, to bring together 
the workers found to have been illegally denied employment in U.S. v. Local 86, 
and whom the court had ordered the unions to hire. Twenty-five of the forty-one 
individuals attended. “They discussed the personal experiences with discrimina-
tion on the job and,” according to a UCWA report, “determined that they would 
work together to fight this discrimination, beginning by going over the new 
court order to inform themselves of their new rights under it.” Starting with 
these workers, and then the dozens of other special apprentices that Lindberg 
had ordered the unions to hire, the UCWA set out to facilitate communication 
and provide legal and political advocacy on behalf of all black workers whose ex-
periences would determine the fate of Lindberg’s affirmative action plan. Within 
a month, its workers-only meetings were drawing as many as one hundred at-
tendees. At the meetings, workers received updates on the enforcement of the 
court order, pooled information about their dispatch from union hiring halls, 
discussed tactics for responding (and not responding) to on-the-job racism, and 
coordinated transportation to work and other activities meant to overcome bar-
riers faced on and off the job.41
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The UCWA advocacy, which was central to the early life of the organization, 
provided a powerful contrast to the black worker recruitment and training done 
by the Urban League and AFL-CIO affiliates around the country in the 1960s and 
1970s. Most affirmative action plans in the construction industry trained new 
workers without educating them about their rights. Without an advocacy arm 
through which workers could demand redress when confronted with on-the-job 
union or contractor racism, these training programs effectively depoliticized the 
civil rights struggles.
The bypassing of the Seattle Urban League by the UCWA was delicate and 
facilitated indirectly by unions’ refusal to differentiate between the managerial 
approach to civil rights politics of the Urban League and the radical democratic 
politics of the UCWA. In fall 1969, the Seattle Urban League hired Cecil Col-
lins as a full-time staff person to support black contractors, anticipating that 
this would set the Urban League up to administer any forthcoming affirmative 
action plan. In December 1969, Collins tried to convince the Seattle AFSC to 
limit its advocacy in the construction industry to “attitude changing, such as the 
sensitivity training conducted within some big businesses.” Collins reportedly 
told the AFSC in spring 1970 that a black workers’ organization might needlessly 
inflame tensions and told the AFSC that, as a predominantly white organization, 
it should not get directly involved in the building trades dispute. But with unions 
and employers unable to find common ground, the hopes of the Urban League 
to administer a local hometown plan were dashed. By September 1970, just two 
months after the founding of the UCWA, the Seattle Urban League realized that 
the Department of Labor would not fund its proposal to recruit black appren-
tices and withdrew its request, essentially ceding responsibility to the UCWA 
and the courts. The UCWA seized on its new role by trying to link the enforce-
ment of Title VII to local community control politics and the radical democratic 
ethos of the New Left. “ ‘Power to the People’ becomes a fact, not a slogan,” the 
AFSC announced, “when a black construction workers’ organization is assist-
ing a court appointed committee to carry out the court’s orders regarding equal 
employment.”42
But with unemployment skyrocketing, union resistance rampant, and the 
COAC resistant to providing the UCWA any official power, the UCWA struggled 
to support the workers that it advocated for. “We spent a great deal of that [first] 
year,” Scott recalled, “just replacing guys that had dropped off the program.” Part 
of the reason for the high black apprentice attrition was that slow economic times 
provided both a legitimate reason and an excuse for union dispatchers to slow the 
employment of black trainees. In this context, Scott said, “[A] Black apprentice 
might be out of work for a period of two or three months, while he is required 
to go to school . . . and of course his position was ‘why should I go to school when 
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I’m not working?’ And he hadn’t stockpiled a bank account or anything. That 
was a cause for a lot of the attrition: the inability to work regularly.”43
The UCWA responded to the economic crisis by scrambling to find contrac-
tors willing to employ black workers. “With all the jobs gone,” an AFSC report 
noted, “placement has been limited to finding occasional jobs by pegging in-
dividual contractors who are either sympathetic, working in strategic Central 
Area locations, or who had been told by contract compliance officers to take on 
additional minority workers.” In a number of cases, contractors accommodated 
affirmative action mandates by reducing the number of white journeymen on 
the job, further exacerbating tensions between white and black workers.44
Once on the job, black workers developed both individual and organizational 
responses to their conflicts with white workers. Each act of resistance was fraught 
with complex calculations about whether it was safe to speak out at a dangerous 
and hierarchical workplace. Individually, trainees did everything from disobey-
ing orders to bringing guns to work to quitting. According to Tyree Scott, differ-
ences in white and black working-class cultures exacerbated workplace conflicts 
over affirmative action: “The Black worker might be 25, 30-years old. This [blank 
in transcript] has never had no job, ain’t got no tools, coming to work in his high 
heeled shoes, and doesn’t fit in, and also alienated from his white counterpart, 
who is hostile to him. So as a result, he shows up late, don’t show up at all, gets 
into an argument with him.”45
As black trainees asserted themselves at work, a workplace already prone to 
“physical horseplay” became increasingly tense and dangerous. As Michael Woo, 
a UCWA organizer, recalled,
it was not the kind of work culture environment that would be tolerated 
in any way today. . . . It was an environment where these workers weren’t 
feeling safe. We could visibly see the handguns, they would come from 
their job sites right to these [UCWA] meetings with their handguns 
because they were not feeling safe on these jobs. And I’m sure likewise a 
lot of the white workers were armed as well.46
UCWA meetings generally advocated preventive measures for deescalating 
situations on the job, teaching apprentices to not be baited into reacting to rac-
ist taunts in ways that could get them kicked off the job or out of the program. 
At meetings attended by dozens and sometimes as many as a hundred workers, 
UCWA leaders collected workers’ stories from their jobs, kept track of union 
and contractor resistance, received updates from their attorneys, and strategized 
about the direction of the organization for the following days and weeks.47
When all else failed, UCWA activists selectively used construction site 
closures—a kind of strike by a community union—to resolve specific grievances. 
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As a dramatic example, Scott recalled that, when a black worker told a UCWA 
meeting that he had been given menial work by a journeyman in his trade only 
to be told by a member of another union that such work was outside his juris-
diction, “everyone thought that was absurd, what the hell, we have the right to 
work.” The following morning, nearly one hundred black workers skipped their 
jobs, brought sticks and pipes to the construction site where the black trainee 
had been refused work, kicked all the plumbers off the job while allowing other 
workers from nonoffending unions to keep working, and forced the journey-
man plumber to give the black trainee a meaningful job.48 Taken together, these 
strategies that UCWA members developed for learning a trade in a hostile work-
place environment highlight a new labor radicalism that emerged outside and 
sometimes in opposition to organized labor to enforce affirmative action plans 
in the 1970s.
From Jobs to Power
The escalating conflict between black and white workers on the job sent shock 
waves through the ineffectual structures meant to oversee their collaboration. By 
the time the U.S. Supreme Court denied the last appeal of the Seattle unions on 
December 7, 1971, the Seattle court order had been failing for some time. High at-
trition rates, the poor progress of the special apprentices in their accelerated two-
year programs, and the open resistance of contractors and unions to the order had 
demoralized the COAC staff and committee members. Judge Lindberg solicited 
proposals to amend the court order for at least six months prior to the time he 
met with the COAC to discuss them. The unions, however, boycotted the meeting. 
Rieke, who chaired the meeting, recalled Lindberg’s frustration that the goals of 
the court order continued to go unmet despite the fact that “the goals set in the 
Court Order are so modest that even in a weak economy they should be accom-
plished.” In response to the looming sense of failure, the minority members of 
the COAC called for a higher ratio of nonwhite apprentices to be hired, but their 
“recommendation was opposed by Union and Management representation on the 
committee and no action was taken by the court.”49
By early 1972, UCWA activists surveyed the political and economic landscape 
created by high attrition rates at the workplace. Noting that there were at least 
ninety fewer black apprentices in the trades than were required by Lindberg’s 
order, a sense of despair mixed with outrage began setting in. White union 
power, solidarity, and experience had largely trumped the courageous but under-
funded attempts of outside groups such as the UCWA to create an atmosphere 
on construction sites that could prevent black trainees from being driven out. 
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Despite acknowledging the failure to meet court-ordered requirements, neither 
the COAC nor Judge Lindberg had laid out an enforcement plan that would put 
the implementation of the order back on track toward meeting its hiring goals. 
“We were outraged about it,” Scott recalled, “and all we were doing was going 
through that legal mumbo-jumbo.”50
 “We thought about closing the whole thing (the UCWA) down,” Scott told 
one reporter in 1972. “It was becoming just another central area social-service 
agency. I didn’t think that was a proper role.”
We had gotten to the point that we said, “to hell with it, we haven’t done 
any good, all this effort . . . [19]69, 70, 71—all we have to show for it is 
30–35 people in the industry.” So we decided to go for broke. . . . We sat 
down and we planned it from day one that we were going to either win 
or lose, we would take them on one more time in the streets. And just 
show them that they were violating the court’s orders.51
The campaign was a make or break movement to demand full and immediate 
implementation of the court order that quickly evolved into call for something 
that no court or government had heretofore granted minority workers or their 
representatives—inclusion as formal parties in the litigation that had imposed 
affirmative action on their behalf.
The subsequent construction site closures led by UCWA activists brought the 
informal conflict between white and black workers to a new level of crisis that 
barely avoided becoming an all-out gunfight. On June 1, 1972, UCWA leaders 
broke into the control room of the floating bridge on Interstate 90 (I-90) and 
jammed the bridge open to block the Seattle Police Department Tactical Squad 
from getting to the other side of Lake Washington. In the meantime, forty UCWA 
activists “shut down all I-90 projects [on a five-mile stretch] between Belle-
vue and Issaquah,” doing at least $5,000 in damage to construction equipment in 
the process. Construction resumed on I-90 the following day, but UCWA activ-
ists continued their campaign by shutting down construction at two privately 
funded skyscrapers: Safeco Tower in the University District and the Financial 
Center building downtown. They also skipped a scheduled meeting with George 
Andrews, the head of the Washington State Highway Department, thumbing 
their nose at further participation in what they considered to be pointless nego-
tiations. By June 5, when they closed seven different University of Washington 
job sites, the UCWA had disrupted more than $50 million in construction proj-
ects in less than a week.52
At an emergency COAC meeting held on June 5, thirty UCWA members pre-
sented non-negotiable demands and left without entertaining any discussion. 
The demands included full and immediate implementation of the court order 
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to meet its hiring goals; “Complete control over all minority dispatches to con-
struction work in Seattle”; and no work on any area construction projects until 
the court order was implemented in full. St. Laurent, the Labor Council head, 
boycotted the meeting. Glen Arnold, union representative, walked out as soon 
as the UCWA members arrived en masse. Dan Ruthford, the contractors’ rep-
resentative, warned that the unions were fed up and workers at some sites had 
voted to physically resist any further job closures.53
That same day, at the request of the AGC, Superior Court Judge David Hunter 
issued a restraining order against further UCWA job closures. The UCWA, dis-
enchanted with what they considered to be the hypocrisy of the law, ignored the 
order. When served with the order the following morning, Tyree Scott publicly 
burned it, saying it should be ignored “just as the court order is not being fol-
lowed.” Todd Hawkins later explained that it “was a symbolic burning. The paper 
wasn’t no good to us. We thought the paper meant something too, and every 
time we tried to play the game with the paper, we always got better results when 
we went to direct action.”54
After burning the restraining order, Scott led a march of black workers and 
their supporters through the black neighborhood of Seattle, stopping jobs along 
the way and finally arriving at Seattle Central Community College (SCCC). The 
following three days of protest became the climax of three years of direct action 
by black construction workers in Seattle. When protesters arrived to shut down 
construction at the community college, the fifty workers on the job refused to 
stop working. The job supervisor and a protester got in a fistfight that had to be 
broken up. Following this altercation, white workers gathered on the second floor 
of the building, shouted epithets, and dumped water on protesters. In response, a 
number of black protesters scaled the building ladders and beat the white work-
ers. Austin St. Laurent, who was with the workers who refused to quit work, was 
hit across the back, knocked to the ground, and had his glasses broken. Another 
union representative was knocked unconscious, while a third, Henry Andes, after 
stepping up to defend St. Laurent, was hit across the face with a rebar pipe and 
knocked unconscious while his head was repeatedly beaten into the ground (he 
was taken to the hospital to have his jaw reset). Instead of arresting the perpetra-
tors, the police, who had done little to intervene until fighting broke out, arrested 
Tyree Scott, Todd Hawkins, and three prominent UCWA allies.55
The next day, Scott joined over 175 UCWA protesters and allies at the col-
lege and found the school ringed with police and filled with armed construction 
workers, many of whom were former veterans. Andes recalled that “the construc-
tion workers on the job were about the most heavily armed civilian personnel 
I’ve ever seen: 44 magnums, handguns all the way down to sawed off shotguns 
were there.” Scott and other UCWA activists, clandestinely listening to the police 
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radio, had learned about the situation that faced them and decided that trying to 
occupy the construction site would be suicidal. Instead, the protesters raided and 
badly vandalized an unprotected working building that was part of the college 
campus. With as many as nine hundred people in the building, protesters broke 
110 windows and caused over $15,000 in damage in less than seven minutes. Exit-
ing from the back of the building to avoid the police in front, nearly one hundred 
protesters encountered only a dozen police who tried to stop them. Photos of the 
pitched street battle between police and half a dozen of black activists wearing 
hard hats and wielding two-by-fours made it into the local newspapers and put 
the ineffectiveness of the court order on display better than any statistic could.56
That afternoon, Lindberg issued a supplement to his court order that (1) man-
dated a 1 : 5 minority apprentice-to-journeyman ratio, (2) required the enroll-
ment of a minimum of 180 special apprentices by July 7 to meet the requirements 
of the court order (there were only 86 enrolled when he issued his order), and 
(3) granted the COAC authority to directly petition the court instead of using 
Department of Justice lawyers as intermediaries. He did not grant the UCWA 
dispatch authority or make it a party to the lawsuit, although he promised that a 
decision on these issues was forthcoming.57
June 8 brought the third day of protests at the college as well as a change 
of tactics by the protesters that was meant to deescalate what had become an 
extremely dangerous situation. It was, according to Scott, “the biggest demon-
stration we ever had. Everybody was there, the middle class people, priests, all 
sorts of folks, women and children. So we had a responsibility at that point, not 
to get people’s heads beat.” Scott, Hawkins, and two other UCWA allies chose to 
be voluntarily arrested to stop the street fighting and return the battle for Black 
Power to the courts. “We’re not getting moderate. We just don’t want to get killed,” 
Scott claimed. “If we continue now they’re going to kill some of us because we’re 
so-called violent.” They planned to use their time in jail to fast and dramatize 
the hypocrisy of black workers’ being in jail while court-ordered hiring require-
ments continued to go unmet. But, instead, the district court judge waived bail 
after they refused to pay it, releasing them despite the fact that they refused to 
sign their own release papers. “This is embarrassing,” Scott told the Seattle Times, 
now thoroughly disillusioned with what he considered the arbitrary enforcement 
of the law. “Getting thrown out of jail. This is as low as you can get.”58
Following his ejection from jail, Scott led a series of community rallies to 
press for the UCWA to be granted dispatch power over minority workers. At a 
June 11 rally at Garfield High School, he linked the UCWA struggle to that of the 
black community more generally, saying, “What we want is the right for commu-
nity control. That’s what it means, the right to have minority workers dispatch 
out minority workers.”59
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Lindberg made the UCWA party to the Local 86 lawsuit and official members 
of the COAC on June 12, 1972, but he again delayed a decision on dispatching 
power. When the COAC reconvened, union leaders boycotted it and contractors 
refused to endorse Scott’s proposal to give the UCWA dispatching authority. But, 
because the contractors abstained from voting, a unanimous vote granted the 
UCWA dispatch power anyway. The vote, although only symbolic, once again 
threw the COAC into crisis.60
In response to Lindberg’s new order, St. Laurent claimed that Judge was se-
nile and called for his resignation. He announced his own resignation from the 
COAC in an open letter that claimed, “by giving [UCWA] dispatch or any other 
semblance of recognition, the judge would be, in effect, creating a new, separate, 
all-black union, which is what we don’t want. We want everyone together in the 
present unions.”61 He complained that “it appears that every action of the Court 
in this case has been in reaction to illegal acts of violence and threats of such 
violence.” And he seemed to threaten white worker violence by warning, “we are 
presently unable to continue to control our membership (both black and white) 
because of their belief that the Department of Justice and the Court is using the 
United Construction Workers Association (UCWA) and Tyree Scott to attempt 
to destroy the construction unions.”62
The day that St. Laurent resigned from the COAC and called for Lindberg 
to be removed from his job, the UCWA organized a fifty-hour vigil outside the 
federal courthouse supported by members of the Church Council of Greater 
Seattle, who brought food and sleeping bags. But June 15 came and went with 
Lindberg again delaying his decision on how to reconstitute the COAC or on 
how black workers would be dispatched to construction sites. On June 16, the 
UCWA led a march that, in addition to black radicals, included Asian, Chicano, 
and white left activists. Together, they closed down three large and three small 
construction sites.63
The pressure eventually paid off. In July 1972, Judge Lindberg added the 
UCWA to the suit, gave it representation in the COAC, formalized its role as a 
counselor for and screener of all black apprentices prior to union dispatch, and 
issued a permanent injunction against the UCWA’s shutting down another con-
struction site. By making black workers’ private grievances public and by taking 
the ongoing crisis within the construction industry from the workplace back 
into the streets, the UCWA had successfully linked affirmative action enforce-
ment to black worker empowerment.64
The events of June 1972 thus broke the back of union resistance to affirmative 
action in the Seattle construction industry. Judge Lindberg’s order, produced in 
response to over a month of militant direct-action protests, stood as a model for 
government activism at a time when the Department of Labor was retreating 
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from affirmative action in an attempt to woo conservative working-class white 
ethnics to vote for Nixon in 1972. St. Laurent, outraged, canceled the parallel 
union affirmative action program and abandoned his claims that unions could 
oversee desegregation without cooperation from African American community 
organizations. In the time between Lindberg’s temporary supplemental order 
in June and when it was made permanent in July 1972, seventy-five special ap-
prentices were added to the previous ninety-two of the program, showing the 
power of community action to bring about a quick change of structures that had 
claimed to be hamstrung by political and economic constraints.65
The UCWA victory contrasted sharply with the experiences of black work-
ers in cities across the country, for whom the failure of affirmative action plans 
brought further marginalization rather than empowerment. UCWA got more 
jobs for black workers in June 1972 than many affirmative action plans operating 
for two years in cities that were significantly larger and more racially diverse than 
Seattle. The more than one hundred voluntary plans across the country were 
unable to deal with high black attrition and low union compliance. In Chicago, 
the city that had the first voluntary plan for its construction industry and that 
was used as a model for hometown plans in other cities, the call to hire 4,000 
new black apprentices in one year was met with only 75 new recruits. In addi-
tion, a city alderman who oversaw the finances of the program embezzled large 
amounts of Department of Labor money, and the plan collapsed in rancor. In 
Philadelphia, the original test case for affirmative action in the construction in-
dustry, plans for 1,000 new jobs for black workers in the first year brought only 
60 hires. In Pittsburgh, the second city with a voluntary hometown plan, two 
years and $500,000 (some of it embezzled) produced only ten successful gradu-
ates of a black apprenticeship program. From Boston to San Francisco, Detroit 
to Atlanta, the statistics invariably told the same story: widespread failure to even 
come close to meeting the desegregation goals. By the end of 1972, the New York 
Times reported that “the Nixon administration has reportedly all but abandoned 
efforts to force Federal contractors to hire more blacks,” and quoted a federal 
compliance officer as saying that “morale around here has hit the floor.”66
In this context, NAACP Labor Director Herbert Hill and law professor Wil-
liam Gould began to tout the Seattle court order as an alternative means for 
making affirmative action work in the 1970s. A few years later, even Ray Mar-
shall, President Carter’s secretary of labor, coauthored a book that singled out 
the UCWA community action model of enforcing affirmative action as some-
thing for other cities to emulate.67
Yet UCWA activists did not kid themselves about the immediate effect of 
their victory in 1972. Despite the Lindberg order requirement to train 270 black 
workers in its first three years, only six workers had actually finished their training 
184      TREVOR GRIFFEY
and become journeymen by summer 1972. The inclusion of the UCWA in the 
court order did not promise that it would be able to overcome the substantial 
barriers to training, placing, and making black workers full members in their re-
spective unions. But it did give UCWA activists new means and new inspiration 
to promote a model of community organizing through Title VII law that gave 
black workers power to regulate workplace culture without placing the onus for 
change entirely on their shoulders.68
Title VII Community Organizing
Heady from their inclusion in the U.S. v. Local 86 case, UCWA leaders branched 
out in numerous directions with the hope of planting the seeds of a national 
movement of minority worker radicalism based on the UCWA model. Between 
1971 and 1974, the UCWA used its AFSC contacts in other cities to try to develop 
chapters outside Seattle—organizing black construction workers in Portland 
and Denver and hiring a former Black Panther to organize black truck drivers in 
Oakland, California. These efforts, however, quickly fizzled: local community ac-
tivists proved wary of outsiders, and aggressive litigation strategies did not always 
fit with the desires of the communities to which the UCWA tried to expand.
But, in 1973, the UCWA secured a contract from the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to host workshops on workers’ rights under 
the 1972 Civil Rights Act in eight mid-size cities in Oklahoma, Texas, Louisi-
ana, and Arkansas. Instead of hosting workshops, Scott, Hawkins, and Michael 
Simmons, an AFSC activist, decided to use the EEOC grant to do community 
organizing. They traveled from city to city—attending churches, visiting local 
Urban League and NAACP offices, hanging out in pool halls and barber shops, 
and attending barbeques—all the time asking about workplace discrimination 
and talking about what they had accomplished in Seattle.69
After gathering stories and making connections, Scott and Hawkins started 
small community organizations of blue-collar workers, trained workers to col-
lect testimony for Title VII lawsuits, and connected workers with attorneys from 
Seattle, Stanford, and New York to assist with their legal strategy. In December 
1973, as the EEOC grant expired, the UCWA held a conference in Waco, Texas, that 
brought together three hundred people from the eight cities to found a federation 
for their worker-led community organizations to sustain their aggressive cam-
paigns to desegregate local industries. The umbrella organization they created, the 
Southwest Workers Federation (SWF), filed five Title VII lawsuits in seven months 
and at least 25 EEOC complaints in each city challenging racism in major indus-
tries throughout the region (the Little Rock chapter produced over 100 EEOC 
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complaints alone). The SWF continued for roughly five years as black workers 
took advantage of the legal training they received to organize activist commu-
nity groups that addressed everything from employment discrimination to police 
accountability to antiapartheid activism. In cities such as Tulsa and Shreveport, 
where white supremacy had been so entrenched that the civil rights movements 
there had rarely used nonviolent direct action, these new worker organizations 
became the most vocal and outspoken Black Power organizations the cities had.70
Meanwhile, in Seattle, the UCWA success in 1972 played an important role in 
the development of a worker-centered U.S. Third World Left in the mid-1970s. 
The distinguishing features of this emergent left were (1) multiracial solidarity; 
(2) a language of third world, rather than minority or people of color, to describe 
the communities that activists sought to unite in common cause; and (3) a labor 
radicalism whose campaigns for “self-determination” at home were framed in 
solidarity with “third world” independence movements abroad.71
The UCWA influence on Asian American radicalism in the Pacific Northwest 
was especially significant. In 1972, the UCWA provided seed money to Michael 
Woo, its Chinese American staff person, and a group of young Filipino activists 
to use the UCWA organizational model to combat racism in the Alaska can-
nery industry. These activists created the Alaska Cannery Workers Association 
(ACWA), filed a number of Title VII lawsuits, and used these lawsuits (which 
prohibit retaliatory firing) to protect themselves against International Longshore 
and Warehouse Union (ILWU) Local 37 and employer attempts to blacklist them. 
ACWA activists then created the Seattle chapter of the Filipino communist 
organization, the Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino (KDP, or Union 
of Democratic Filipinos). This group, the only pan-Asian chapter of the KDP, 
played a large role in organizing grassroots pressure to preserve Seattle’s Interna-
tional District. These same activists also formed a Local 37 Rank and File Com-
mittee, and began connecting their union reform politics to solidarity campaigns 
against the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship (the corrupt union dispatch system 
rewarded allies of Marcos).72
Although growing in different directions, the ACWA and UCWA continued to 
collaborate through the Northwest Labor and Employment Law Office (LELO), 
which they cofounded in 1974. A law office for worker-led movements that was 
separate from the War on Poverty lawyers they had previously relied on, LELO 
hired lawyers to oversee the various lawsuits filed by the Washington state United 
Farm Workers (UFW), the ACWA, and the UCWA. The LELO Board of Directors 
originally consisted of three Filipino cannery workers, three Mexican farm work-
ers, and three black construction workers.73
The experience of international travel played an important role in UCWA 
members’ analytical shift from antiracist to anti-imperialist organizing in the 
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mid-1970s. In 1971, UCWA leaders cofounded, along with AFSC-related groups 
across the country, the AFSC Third World Coalition (TWC). The TWC de-
manded affirmative action within the AFSC; the involvement of nonwhite people 
in the AFSC international peace work; and a rethinking of the AFSC mission 
from promoting peace abroad through charity work to promoting peace and 
justice through the support of anticolonial struggles. Milton Jefferson, UCWA 
activist, became the first TWC president, and Tyree Scott helped involve other 
Seattle-area activists by forming a northwestern TWC chapter that played an 
active role in national TWC affairs. Roberto Maestas, a Seattle Chicano activ-
ist, served as TWC president a couple of years after Jefferson. Under both men’s 
leadership, the TWC provided an umbrella through which radical organizations 
around the country networked with one another and accessed resources from 
the AFSC that few other such radical organizations had. They used this money 
to travel around the world to meet anticolonial third world nationalist and com-
munist revolutionary leaders, and to bring revolutionaries to the United States. 
During this time, Tyree Scott went on a workers delegation to China, and Todd 
Hawkins went to Mozambique. A large delegation of UCWA activists also started 
regularly participating in Venceremos Brigade trips to Cuba.74
International travel helped UCWA members rethink their local struggles in an 
international context. In 1976 when Tyree Scott became cochair of the TWC with 
Michael Simmons, fellow SWF organizer and AFSC staffer, the two spun off its 
affirmative action advocacy to the AFSC human resources department. They then 
focused the TWC on international solidarity work for the next three years. During 
the late 1970s, Simmons and Scott sponsored trips of AFSC organizers of color 
around the world and brought third world revolutionaries to visit the United States. 
They dovetailed their leadership of the TWC with the a new communist group that 
they were active in, the Organizing Committee for an Ideological Center (OCIC). 
Although separate from the AFSC, Scott and Simmons moved between the TWC 
and OCIC seamlessly as they coordinated a network of a dozen city-based revo-
lutionary worker cadres across the country. Their organizing borrowed from the 
worker organizing they had done in the Southwest and even included a few activists 
from Tulsa who had moved to Seattle to be a part of its workers’ group. Simmons’s 
work, in particular, played an important early role in laying the groundwork for 
anti-apartheid activism in the United States in the 1970s.75
In Seattle, the international turn in the outlook of UCWA leaders influenced 
their decision to focus more on consciousness raising and power building than 
on desegregation per se. During the late 1970s, they published No Separate Peace, 
a periodical written by and about workers of color who framed their workplace 
and neighborhood campaigns for justice in Seattle as part of an international 
struggle against U.S. capitalism, white supremacy, and imperialism.76
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The UCWA remained unable, however, to overcome the growing barriers that 
the institutionalization of affirmative action erected against ongoing commu-
nity organizing. Once the UCWA had finally gained power in the COAC, its role 
shifted toward black caucus work within the individual building trades unions. 
But the recession in the construction industry and the decline of union power 
in the 1970s made it difficult to secure additional jobs. Most union members 
remained suspicious of, if not hostile to, UCWA members who showed up to 
union meetings demanding new and more inclusive forms of organizing. Scott 
himself was stretched thin by the ambitiousness of the UCWA expansion, and 
so were a few other UCWA leaders. As a result of his work, Scott was blacklisted, 
and other UCWA members found themselves struggling to get work or sent to 
do jobs that others did not want. The UCWA, along with the SWF, also found 
it easier to gain support from black apprentices and workers who needed to be 
politically active to gain access to jobs. But once jobs were opened up, many 
workers’ political activity became uneven even before Scott and his allies became 
more focused on building worker cadres than building mass protest or social 
service organizations.77
The dissolution of the COAC proved a turning point for the UCWA. In 1978, 
employers, unions, and COAC staff argued that the construction industry had 
finally met Judge Lindberg’s affirmative action goals. Tyree Scott and the UCWA, 
however, complained that the goals had been met only on paper and that racism 
persisted unimpeded. Black apprentices, they argued, had graduated but lacked 
the skills to compete and ended up working in the same shipyard jobs they had 
always been relegated to. Scott also claimed that the union dispatch procedures 
continued to be discriminatory. In response, Rieke, the COAC chair, took a nar-
row view of the court order. He argued that it required the indenture of a certain 
number of workers but never claimed to promise steady employment after they 
had learned a trade. Rieke thus concluded that racism in dispatch procedures or 
on the job was “an issue outside of this particular decree.” After 1978, the respon-
sibility of COAC to recruit black apprentices was thus spun off to a powerless 
social service agency while its oversight of the hiring and training of workers was 
returned to the labor unions, which were weaker than when the desegregation 
battles had begun.78
Without the COAC, UCWA lacked the institutional power that had made it 
distinct from other radical black worker organizations in the 1970s. Attempts 
to expand the UCWA model proved even more difficult. The EEOC backlog 
of discrimination complaints reached the hundreds of thousands by the mid-
1970s, and Title VII lawsuits swelled the dockets of federal district courts around 
the country. With the EEOC badly underfunded and the courts ill-equipped to 
oversee wide-ranging decrees, the institutions established to enforce affirmative 
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action became increasingly bureaucratic and reduced the opportunities for com-
munity organizing. Similarly, as the sense of urgency in response to black urban 
rebellion faded, Title VII case law evolved in a way that made litigation increas-
ingly time-consuming, with some cases initiated by LELO taking between ten 
and fifteen years to resolve. These delays made it more difficult for activists to 
gain the cash settlements that the UCWA had hoped would fund the movement, 
while also making the litigation itself more costly.79
As it became more difficult to use affirmative action law for radical organiz-
ing, the UCWA disbanded, and its leaders folded their community-organizing 
activities into LELO, which they transformed from a law office to a multiracial 
community-based labor organization in Seattle. During the 1990s, LELO facili-
tated the organization of caucuses of workers of color and women within the 
unions; demanded jobs for people of color on public works and urban rede-
velopment projects; and played a prominent role in promoting police account-
ability. It organized local workers of color to protest at the 1999 World Trade 
Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle and worked with other groups around 
the world to develop workers’ proposals to restructure the global economy. LELO 
followed up on these activities in 2001 to connect the themes of global trade and 
local jobs by creating a Port Profits for Human Needs Campaign—inspired by a 
similar successful campaign in Los Angeles in the early 1990s. Tyree Scott’s pass-
ing in 2003 slowed that campaign and LELO organizing. But the alternative labor 
movement that Tyree Scott led, and the generation of multiracial labor radicals 
and antiracist activists that he mentored, continue to organize two-pronged bat-
tles for both jobs and power.80
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